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Abstract 
In this master thesis paper I study corporate default prediction with firm specific financial 
ratios and macroeconomic variables. I show how regressions default prediction ability 
increases when macroeconomic variables are added into the model of financial ratios. In 
analysis I have financial ratio data from period 1999 to 2011 from industries of construction 
and retail including 35000 firms and over 200000 observations. The data is from Suomen 
Asiakastieto, Tilastokeskus and Suomen Pankki. In measuring the goodness of the models I 
use different analysis of the predicted values like five levels risk classification. This risk 
classification can also be thought as credit rating. 
Keywords: default prediction, credit rating, risk classification  
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1. Introduction 
The default prediction of firms is a widely studied issue. When banks and other financial 
institutions are giving loans to firms they have to value the risk of those firms. This is where 
the Credit Rating industry is giving their contribution. Credit Rating institutions are 
measuring the firms’ characteristics from the different data that is available. From these 
characteristics the firms are rated by their risk and are given a credit rating which tells how 
probable is it that the firm is having payment difficulties or even go to bankruptcy in the near 
future. Different Credit Rating industries are using slightly different kind of methods how 
they value the firms and how the rating is written.  For example in United States a Credit 
Rating institution Standard and Poor’s is using 21 level ratings from the lowest speculative 
grade D to the highest investment grade AAA (Cantor & Packer 2006). 
In predicting the default of firms, the most used and most important information is coming 
from the firms’ historical data, which contains ratios from the financial statements, 
information of the firms’ previous payment difficulties and information of the management’s 
possible payment difficulties from other firms they are related. Size and age of firm as well as 
Personal marks of failure in payment behavior also give some information. An example, of 
default prediction based only on financial statement ratios, is widely referred Edward I. 
Altman’s Z-score. In Z-score model there are five financial statement explanatory variables 
with different weights, which are giving the Z-score value.  The Z-score value is explaining 
the probability of the firm’s default in the near future (Altman 1968). 
Even that the issue is widely studied, the models and research is mostly based on firm specific 
financial statement data. The reason for this might be that firm specific models are already 
giving very good predictions of the future risks. And if the model is already good enough it 
might be better to keep it also simple as possible. The simplicity makes it more transparent 
and easier to use and sell to customers. What I find the problem here is that the firm specific 
financial information is, firstly historical and secondly does not tell anything about the 
macroeconomic conditions at certain time. An economic shock can bring huge risks in 
businesses, but we can’t see these risks, if just look to the historical firm specific information. 
My contribution is that I’m trying to find new variables from macroeconomic data to improve 
the ability to predict the probability of default. These “new” macroeconomic variables are 
industry volumes, gross national income, interest rate, consumption and consumer confidence 
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on the economy. One reasons why I think the macroeconomic variables could give new value 
to the firm specific models, is that the financial statement information on small firms is 
historical information and is approximately 18 months old (Asiakastieto), when the 
macroeconomic data of quarterly macroeconomic accountancy is instead 6 to 9 months old 
(Tilastokeskus). So if there is an economic shock like sudden financial crisis, the 18 month 
old firm specific historical data could give a view that everything is fine, but when we are 
looking the industry index or other macroeconomic conditions, we might see that this is 
probably not the case. 
For analysis I’m using firm specific financial ratio data from Suomen Asiakastieto and 
macroeconomic data from Tilastokeskus and Suomen Pankki. I’m studying two different 
industries which are construction and retail. 
The firm specific variables are gearing ratio, quick ratio, return on investment and logarithm 
of net sales. 
The macroeconomic variables are industry index or volume, interest rate, consumption, gross 
national income and consumer confidence on economy, 
The null hypothesis H0 is that the new macroeconomic variables are not giving any new value 
to the existing firm specific models. My ambition is to attack against the null hypothesis and 
try to reject it. My other hypothesis H1, H2 and H3 are: 
H1: The macro level variables are significant in the regression model with financial ratios and 
macroeconomic variables when the dependent variable is default of a firm. 
H2: The macro level variables improve the model’s ability to predict future defaults. 
H3: The newer the macroeconomic data used in model, the more significant the macro 
variables are and better it predicts the future defaults. 
1.1. Progress of the study in this paper 
In section 2 I start with explaining few words about credit rating industry. In section 3 I go 
through the history of the default prediction and the most important authors and papers 
written. In early twentieth century the risks were measured with only one variable like current 
ratio. As decades went by, multiple variable models were used more and more. Finally there 
are nowadays complex models using many variables. Some literature of research of firm 
specific- and macroeconomic covariates are also introduced. In section 4 I go through my 
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hypothesis. In section 5 I start to work with the data. I introduce the data and both the firm 
specific- and macroeconomic variables. Also some graphs of variable means over time are 
introduced. After description of the data I continue with the regressions. I introduce the linear 
and logit model and show the outputs of different linear regressions. After regressions I 
compare the goodness of the model and measure their prediction abilities. My ambiguity is to 
find the most valuable and credible model and also find evidence for my hypothesis. In 
section 6 I explain the use of the prediction model to the test data. Unfortunately my time 
series data is too short to get even a satisfactory test data. There should be at least one 
economic shock in the macroeconomic data to get some results. Now my only shock is the 
2008 financial crisis, but it is already included in sample data. In section 7 I go through the 
results of my hypothesis and in section 8 the conclusions of this study. In conclusions I also 
discuss a little bit of the further research possibilities could be done in the future. 
2. Credit Rating Industry 
When banks and other financial institutions are making loan decisions to the firms and 
individuals they have to measure the customer’s ability to pay. Here is where the credit 
agencies are giving their contribution. Credit agencies are privately owned firms that analyze 
the firms and individuals with large set of historical data. Rating firms the credit rating 
agencies are mostly using the data of firms’ financial history and their past payment behavior. 
The customer of credit rating agency can be the firm itself or the bank between the firm and 
credit rating agency. The bill of the sold credit rating usually goes to the firm either straight 
away or it is included in loan expenses. The credit rating gives a probability of the risk the 
firm will default in its liabilities or how well the firm is expected to success its liabilities. 
Richard Cantor and Frank Packer (1994) are bringing out the history and of the credit rating 
industry and are listing the credit rating agencies in United States. They discuss how financial 
regulations and markets have reliance into credit rating industries. They also give some 
criticism to the credit rating industry because there are differences of meanings of ratings over 
time and also between credit agencies. There is also discussion about the fact that selling 
credit ratings is business and when there are many private owned credit rating agencies there 
is a change that customers buy their rating from the agent that gives them a best rating.   
Different credit rating agencies have long had their own symbols. Some use letters, other use 
numbers. Many are using both in ranking the risk of default from extremely safe to highly 
speculative. For example Standard and Poor’s is using 21 level ratings from the lowest 
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speculative grade D to the highest investment grade AAA. They also use one to three letters 
and plus and minus signs in grading. The other top rated agency named Moody’s is using 
letters and numbers in their 19 level ratings from the lowest grade D to highest quality grade 
Aaa (Cantor & Packer 1994). 
In Finland the credit rating agency Suomen Asiakastieto Oy is also using same kind of seven 
levels grading from the lowest level of D to the highest level of AAA which get only few 
percent of firms. The Suomen Asiakastieto’s rating called Rating Alfa introduces four 
qualities from the firms’ financial history. These are liquidity, solvency, profitability and 
volume. 
3. Science and models 
Erkki K. Laitinen (2005 p.7) state, that science can be defined in many different ways. In 
most cases the mission of science is defined as producing generic information. For this reason 
he defines science as systematic observing of the real world events and producing generic 
information from those events. When we are join the systematic observing and producing 
generic information, we can talk scientific use of financial information so that the credit 
decisions can be made generally more efficiently than before. 
Efficiency in credit decisions mean two things. First is that less and less credit are granted to 
firms which fail in their business and can’t take care of their liabilities. Second, efficiency is 
that less and less happens that the credit is rejected from the successful firms which can take 
care of their liabilities. When credit is granted to a firm which fails it’s liabilities in the near 
future the error is called by Type I error. When credit is rejected from a successful firm, the 
error is called by Type II error. The objective of scientific invocation of financial information 
is to reduce the probability of both types of errors with scientific methods. Generally it is 
considered that Type I errors causes more costs and the interest is more in reducing them. It is 
although important that the successful company gets the credit it needs. (Laitinen 2005 p.7)  
3.1. The use of financial information before 1960 
The credit ratings of firms have been under general interest at least from late nineteenth 
century. The creditors started to interest in measuring the solvency of firms. In other words, 
measuring the probability that the firm can keep up its’ liabilities. In 1870 in the United States 
financial statement information was started to use in credit decisions, but in larger scale it 
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became general in 1890. At that time the analysis of financial statement information was more 
just observing and comparing of different balance sheet items. About the same time the 
segregation of current from non-current items was begun (Horrigan 1968). Roy A. Foulke 
(1945, s. 70) state that this was the most important classification, because the firm’s solvency 
base much on short term assets. In the late 1890 they started to compare the current assets and 
current liabilities. Other ratios were developed too but the most significant was the current 
ratio. (Horrigan 1968).  
Before and during the First World War there were many significant steps in financial ratio 
analysis. First, a fairly large variety of ratios was conceived. For example James Cannon, a 
pioneer of financial statement analysis, used ten different ratios as early as 1905 in a study of 
business borrowers. Second, absolute value criteria began to appear, the most famous being 
the absolute criteria 2 of current ratio. It meant that if current ratio dropped below 2, it meant 
poor solvency. Third some analysts began to recognize the need for relative ratio criteria. 
Despite these developments, many analysts tended to use only one, the current ratio. 
(Horrigan 1968). 
In 1912 Alexander Wall reacted to the apparent needs of more types of ratios and for relative 
ratio criteria by beginning a compilation of a large sample of financial statements from the 
files of commercial brokers. This analysis was culminated in his classic report of 1919, 
“Study of Credit Barometrics.”  In this study, Wall compiled seven different ratios of 981 
firms, for an unspecified time period. He stratified these firms by industry and by 
geographical location, with nine sub-divisions in each of those strata. Although he did not 
subject this data to any further analysis, he believed he found great ratio variation between 
types of businesses. His study was historically significant because it was widely read and it 
made popular the ideas of using many ratios and using empirically determined relative ratio 
criteria in credit rating. (Horrigan 1968). 
During the next decade, the 1920’s, interest in ratios increased remarkably. A virtual 
explosion of publications on the subject of ratio analysis occurred. At the same time, many 
compilations of industry ratio data were begun by trade associations, universities, credit 
agencies, and individual analysts. This process of collecting industry ratio data and computing 
averages therefrom was called “scientific ratio analysis,” but the label “scientific” appears to 
have been a misnomer because there is no evidence that hypothesis formulation and testing 
were carried out. (Horrigan 1968). The science based on that there was found useful limits for 
the ratios from the empirical evidence of real world regularities (Laitinen 2005 s.9). 
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After the classic study of Alexander Wall the simultaneous usage of many ratios increased. 
Wall himself, attempted mitigate the effects of ratio proliferation by developing a ratio index. 
This index was essentially a weighted average of different ratios with the weights being the 
relative value assigned to each ratio by the analyst. This effort was much derided, but he 
appears to have been engaged in a praiseworthy attempt to develop a naïve linear discriminate 
function. (Horrigan 1968) 
In the next decade, the 1930’s the literary discussion of ratios and compilation of industry 
average ratios continued unabated. The attention to the empirical based ratio analysis 
increased. There were two significant developments in this decade relating to ratio analysis. 
The first was that the discussion in the literature of the most efficacious group of ratios. In this 
respect the most successful promoter of his own particular group of ratios was Roy A. Foulke. 
He was successful largely because he could supply annual industry data for his group of ratios. 
Foulke developed a group of fourteen ratios. The publication of his ratios was begun in 1933, 
and this collection of ratios quickly became the most influential and well-known industry 
average series. (Horrigan 1968). 
In 1930 Raymond F. Smith and Arthur H. Winakor analyzed a sample of 29 firms which had 
experienced financial difficulties during the period 1923-1931. They analyzed the prior ten 
years’ trends of the means of twenty ratios. They concluded that the ratio of net working 
capital to total assets was the most accurate and steady indicator of failure, with its decline 
beginning ten years before the occurrence of financial difficulty. However their study suffered 
the shortcoming of lacking a contrasting control group of successful firms. (Horrigan 1968). 
The predictive power of ratios was also carried out in the early 1930’s, and control group 
were used. Paul J. FitzPatrick, using a case-by-case method of analysis, studied the prior three 
to five years’ trends of thirteen types of ratios for twenty firms which had failed during the 
period 1920-1929. Following this up with a comparative analysis of a matched sample of 
nineteen successful firms, he concluded that all his ratios predicted failure to some degree but 
the net profit to net worth, net worth to debt and net worth to fixed assets ratios were 
generally best indicators. The shortcomings of this study were that the sample was too small 
and too selective. In general, the shortcomings of the studies at that time were outweighed by 
the essential importance of their contribution. They represented an extremely significant event 
in the development of ratio analysis because they were the first carefully developed attempts 
to utilize the scientific method for determining the utility of ratios. (Horrigan 1968) 
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In the early 1940’s, Charles L. Merwin published a study, where he analyzed the prior six 
years’ trends of large, unspecified number of ratios of “continuing” and “discontinuing” firms. 
Comparing industry mean ratios of “discontinuing” firms against “estimated normal” ratios, 
he concluded that three ratios were very sensitive predictors of discontinuance, up to as early 
as four to five years in some instances. These ratios were net working capital to total assets, 
net worth to debt, and the current ratio (Horrigan 1968). FitzPatrick’s and Merwin’s studies 
generalized the use of control groups as scientific method. Merwin’s study is the first high 
graded research of ratios as predictors. It attracted many successors in the next decades. 
(Laitinen 2005) 
3.2. Single financial ratios as predictors 
An important milestone in the scientific use in research of financial ratios was achieved in 
1966 by William H. Beaver, when he published his research “Financial Ratios as Predictors of 
failure”. This research is generally valued as pioneer of single ratio analysis in credit rating. 
(Laitinen 2005 s.10) His empirical data considered 79 failed firms and 79 non-failed firms. 
Beaver defines “failure” as the inability of a firm to pay its financial obligations as they 
mature. Operationally, a firm is said to have failed when any of the following events have 
occurred: bankruptcy, bond default, an overdrawn bank account, or nonpayment of preferred 
stock dividend. (Beaver 1966) 
The data was collected from Moody’s Industrial Manual, which was the only source available. 
Moody’s Industrial Manual contains the financial statement data for industrial, publicly 
owned corporations. The population excluded firms of non-corporate form, privately held 
corporations, and nonindustrial firms (e.g., public utilities, transportation companies, and 
financial institutions). The firms in Moody’s tend to be larger in terms of total assets than are 
non-corporate firms and privately held corporations, so this study apply only to firms that are 
members of the population. The choice of this population is admittedly a reluctant one. The 
probability of failure among this group of firms is not as high as it is among smaller firms. In 
this sense, it is not the most relevant population upon which to test the predictive ability of 
ratios. However the chosen population represents over 90 per cent of the invested capital of 
all industrial firms. (Beaver1966) 
The time period being studied was ten years from year 1954 to year 1964. In Moody’s there 
appeared a list of firms that had stopped reporting its financial information. There are many 
reasons for a firm not reporting any more: the name change, merger, liquidation, lack of 
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public interest, and most importantly, failure. From a list of bankrupted firms, the right firms 
were chosen. Final list of failed firms contained 79 firms on which financial statement data 
could be obtained for the first year before failure (Beaver 1966). 
The failed firms were classified according to industry and asset size. The total asset size of 
each firm was obtained from the most recent balance sheet prior to the date of failure. The 
industry and asset size composition were heterogeneous. The 79 failed firms operated in 38 
different industries. The classification of the failed firms according to industry and asset size 
was an essential prerequisite to the selection of the non-failed firms. The selection process 
was based upon a paired-sample design. That means that for each failed firm in the sample, a 
non-failed firm of the same industry and asset size was selected as a pair. (Beaver 1966) 
Beaver analyzed group of firms’ economic performance with 30 different ratios 5 years before 
failures. He observed in his profile analysis that ratio distributions of non-failed firms were 
quite stable throughout the five years before failure. The ratio distributions of the failed firms 
exhibit a marked deterioration as failure approaches. The result is a widening gap between the 
failed and non-failed firms. The gap produces persistent differences in the mean ratios of 
failed and non-failed firms, and the difference increases as the failure approaches. Beaver’s 
empirical research was important scientific step in credit rating with financial ratios, and 
indicated, that single ratios are quite reliable predictors of financial difficulties even 5 years 
before failure. (Beaver 1966) 
After Beaver’s research, the selection of financial ratios was given more scientific weight. For 
example J. Wilcox (1971, 1973, and 1976), A. Santomero and J. Vinso (1977) J. Vinso (1979) 
and James Scott (1981) developed different kind of theories to justify failure predictive ratios 
basing on the risk. The basic thought of these theories is to illustrate the firm’s value, 
liabilities and return to equity, when after one or several periods the firm fails because 
liabilities exceeds the firm’s value. (Laitinen 2005 s.11) 
With this kind of scientific method, it can be shown that the most vital ratios illustrate the 
firm’s solidity, profitability and its volatility risk. James Scott (1981, s.337-338) add an 
assumption that when firm is selling its assets in the risk of bankruptcy, it face up some fixed 
costs. These fixed costs are not size related. Because of this the large companies face smaller 
fixed costs, which inflect the bankruptcy risk. For this, the size of firm is also an essential 
predictor. The theory explains the firm’s development to bankruptcy with its solvency. Scott 
presumed that the firm’s assets face some liquidity problems and is not easy to sell because of 
imperfect markets. The liquidity is though also an interpretative factor to the risk of 
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bankruptcy. He states that the prediction of bankruptcy is empirically possible and 
theoretically explainable. 
Aatto Prihti (1975) was pioneer in Finland in research of corporate bankruptcy with balance 
sheet information. His doctoral thesis was aiming to develop a theoretical model that could 
notice a risk of upcoming bankruptcy. In his model a firm is seen as series of consecutive 
investments. The investments are financed with cash flows and with equity and debt. From 
different cash flows the minimum demand of yield can be measured and the investments 
should make profits at least that amount. If the firm fail in this, it end up into a situation 
where it loses credibility in the eyes of interest group and is no longer able to get finance. In 
the study Prihti tested with three different ratios and their trends in several years. These ratios 
were: 
 ratio 1 = 
	  
   
 ratio 2 = 
     
   
 ratio 3 = 

  
 
3.3. Multiple variable models 
A single ratio can illustrate the firm’s performance quite well, but as predictor of failure it 
lacks in essential information. For example the return on equity doesn’t necessary give 
reliable information of the possible failure in the future, because it doesn’t say anything about 
the firm’s debts. Even so, it might still give some good information of the firm’s condition. 
When a single ratio lacks information, it might feel reasonable to use many different types of 
ratios together. 
Edvard I. Altman (1968) was a pioneer in studying multiple variable models. Altman reason 
his study, because academicians seemed moving toward the elimination of ratio analysis as an 
analytical technique. He sees the multiple variable analysis as an opportunity to improve the 
scientific attitude and appreciation in academicians. Altman used multiple discriminant 
analysis (MDA) as the appropriate statistical technique. (Altman 1986) 
MDA attempts to derive a linear combination of characteristics which “best” discriminates 
between groups. If a particular object, for instance a corporation, has characteristics (financial 
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ratios) which can be quantified for all the companies in the analysis, the MDA determines a 
set of discriminant coefficients. (Altman 1986)  
Altman concerned two groups, bankrupt firms on one hand, and non-bankrupt firms on the 
other. The analysis is transformed into its simplest form: one dimension. The discriminant 
function of the form Z = v1 x1 + v2 x2 + … + vn xn transforms individual variable values to a 
single discriminant score or Z-value, which is then used to classify the object, 
where v1 ,v2, … vn = Discriminant coefficients 
  x1, x2, … xn = Independent variables 
The MDA computes the discriminant coefficients, vj, while the independent variables xj are 
the actual values 
 where j = 1, 2, … n. 
When utilizing a comprehensive list of financial ratios in assessing a firm’s bankruptcy 
potential, there is reason to believe that some of the measurements will have a high degree of 
correlation or collinearity with each other. MDA is a statistical technique used to classify an 
observation into one of several a priori groupings dependent upon the observation’s 
individual characteristics. It is used primarily to classify and/or make predictions in problems 
where the dependent variable appears in qualitative form. (Altman 1986) 
3.4. The use of background information in prediction 
When the study of predicting corporate failure is mostly based on financial information, the 
non-financial background information as predictor is not so studied subject. The first 
background information based predicting model was developed by John Argenti (1983) in his 
study “Predicting Corporate Failure”. The model is named A-model. The model is based on 
large amount of bankruptcies and Argenti’s own findings, but not into statistical methods. In 
the model there is subjective pointing system, which is based on an opinion of a risk 
evaluating company analyst. The analyst makes the justifications by visiting the company and 
meeting the directors of the company. (Argenti 1983)  
In the model there are 17 points answering the defects, mistakes and symptoms of the 
company. The defects can be can be in management, in accounting system and in attitudes to 
changes in environment. Mistakes are excessive incurring of a debt, uncontrollable growth 
and too large project. After mistakes the symptoms follow. The symptoms are weakening 
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ratios, cover-up of financial standing, non-financial symptoms like weakening product or 
service, sick leaves of management, changes in management and moral down turn. (Argenti 
1983) 
Keasey and Watson (1987) tested in their study the significance of non-financial based on A-
model. Their data considered independently owned companies in the North East of England 
from 1970 to 1983. A sample contained 73 failed and 73 non-failed companies. Also the 
results were tested with 20 out-of-sample companies. There were 18 non-financial variables 
and 28 financial ratios describing the companies. The dependent variables were failure and 
non-failure. These non-financial and financial variables were studied in three models as 
follows: 
 Model 1: Financial ratios only 
 Model 2: Non-financial information only 
 Model 3: Financial ratios and non-financial information 
The non-financial variables are listed below in table 3.1. 
 
Keasey and Watson claim in their conclusions that their non-finacial data predicts marginally 
better than traditional financial ratios. Their results may indicate this, but I have doubts of 
trusting just this quite small study of just 73 failed and 73 non-failed companies and the test 
sample only 10 failed and 10 non-failed companies. It feels somehow obvious that there are 
large differences in the “means” of quality of failed (bankrupted) and non-failed healthy 
companies. 
3.5. Models and macroeconomic 
Kenneth Carling, Tor Jacobson, Jesper Lindé and Kasper Roszbach (2007) estimated a 
duration model to explain the survival time to default for borrowers in the business loan 
Table 3.1.
Q 1. Age of company (in years) Q 10. Has the company received a "Going Concern" qualification?
Q 2. Number of current directors Q 11. Is there a secured loan on the company's assets?
Q 3. Has there been any new directors over the 3 year period? Q 12. Is there a secured loan on the company's assets held by a bank?
Q 4. Has a director left the company over the 3 year period? Q 13. Average audi lag (in months) over the 3 year period
Q 5. Number of non-director shareholders Q 14. Average submission lag (in months) over the 3 year period
Q 6. Has there been any new share capital introduced? Q 15. Average lag (in months) between auditor's signature and submission
Q 7. Has there been any change of auditors in 3 years? Q 16. Final year audit lag (in months)
Q 8. Has the company had a qualified audit report in prior 2 years? Q 17. Final year submission lag (in months)
Q 9. Has the company received a qualified audit report in curren year? Q 18. Final year lag (in months) between auditor's signature and submission
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portfolio of a major Swedish bank over period 1994-2000. Their model takes into account 
both, the firm specific characteristics, such as accounting ratios, payment behavior and loan 
related information, and the prevailing macroeconomic conditions such as the output gap, the 
yield curve and consumers expectation of future economic development. They also compared 
the model with a frequently used model that uses only firm specific information. They find 
out that their macroeconomic variables had significant explanatory power and their model 
was able to account the absolute level of risk. 
Sudneer Chava, Catalina Stefanescu and Stuart Turnbull (2011) focus modeling and 
predicting the loss prediction for credit risky assets such as bonds and loans. They model the 
probability of default and recovery rate given default based on shared covariates. They 
develop a new class default models that explicitly accounts for sector specific and regime 
dependent unobservable heterogeneity in firm characteristics. Based on the analysis of a large 
default and recovery data set over the horizon 1980 to 2008, they document that the 
specification of the default model has a major impact on the predicted loss distribution, 
whereas the specification of the recovery model is less important. In particular, they find 
evidence that industry factors and regime dynamics affect the performance of default model.  
Implying that the appropriate choice of default models for loss prediction will depend on the 
credit cycle and portfolio characteristics. They also show that default probabilities and 
recovery rates predicted out of sample are negatively correlated and that the magnitude of the 
correlation varies with seniority class, industry and credit cycle. 
Darrel Duffie, Leandro Saita and Ke Wang (2005) published a paper named Multi-period 
corporate default prediction with stochastic covariates. They provided maximum likelihood 
estimators of term structures of conditional probabilities of corporate default, incorporating 
dynamics of firm specific and macroeconomic covariates. Their data considered US Industrial 
firms based on over 390000 firm months and over 2007 firms for the period 1980 to 2004. 
They find evidence on significant dependence of the level and shape of the term structure of 
conditional future default probabilities on a firm’s distance to default and on US interest rates 
and stock market returns, among other covariates. Variation in a firm’s distance to default has 
a substantially greater effect on the term structure of future default hazard rates than does a 
comparatively significant change in any of the other covariates. The shape of the term 
structure of conditional default probabilities reflects the time-series behavior of the covariates, 
especially leverage targeting by firms and mean reversion in macroeconomic performance. 
Their model is based on a Markov state vector of firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates 
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that causes inter temporal variation in a firm’s default intensity. They also introduce a 
comprehensive literature review about the issue. 
4. Hypothesis 
Here I bring out the hypothesis of my research. In this paper my ambition is to bring new 
variables and new perspectives to the prediction of firms’ payment difficulties and bankruptcy. 
Since traditionally the predictive variables used in the prediction models have only been firms’ 
financial ratios, I’ll try to make the models better by attaching there some new 
macroeconomic variables. The macro level numbers can be newer than the financial ratios at 
hand at some point of time. The older the financial statement data is compared to the macro 
level numbers the more significant I assume it to be that the macro level numbers bring new 
value to the models. 
I study three things. First, I study how significant are the macro level variables when they 
attached into the model created with financial ratios. Second I Study, if the macro level 
variables make the predictions of default better. Third I study how the freshness of the ratios 
and macro level variables affect to the results of predictions.  
Here are my three hypotheses: 
H1: The macro level variables are significant in the regression model with financial ratios and 
macroeconomic variables when the dependent variable is default of a firm. 
H2: The macro level variables improve the model’s ability to predict future defaults. 
H3: The newer the macroeconomic data used in model, the more significant the macro data is 
and better it predicts the future defaults. 
5. Econometric Research 
For empirical research I use Econometrics and linear and logit regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is default and explanatory variables are firm specific ratios and maybe 
their variations and different macroeconomic variables. Also default history is taken into 
account since it expect to have significant part in the risk of future defaults.  
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5.1. Data 
The firm specific financial statement data is collected from the sources of Suomen 
Asiakastieto Oy. Suomen Asiakastieto collects and analyses data from the Finnish companies 
and private citizens. Their sources include marks of the payment behavior of firms and 
individuals also. The macroeconomic data of national economy is collected from 
Tilastokeskus except interest rate is from the sources of Suomen Pankki. 
The firm specific financial statement data collected to this research, consider 35139 firms. 
These firms have altogether 201708 observations. The number of observations decreases a bit 
from this, when I start working with the data in section 5.3. The firms are from two different 
industries, which are construction and retail. The firm specific ratios from financial statements 
are from the beginning of 1999 to the end of 2011 and occur yearly. There are only firms 
whose accounting period is calendar year. This is because it’s easier to connect the data to the 
macroeconomic data and the comparison between different periods of time is possible.  
The macroeconomic data consider a time period from the beginning of 1999 to the end of 
2011 and occur quarterly. When the regression model is used, the best results are supposed to 
come from the newest data. It means that the newest numbers are used also from the financial 
statement data and the macroeconomic data. In the research I’m using different quarterly 
numbers with the last financial statement ratios. This is because it depends which time of year 
the model is used. I assume that the macroeconomic variables are more significant the older 
the financial statement data is comparison to the macroeconomic data. 
Multicollinearity between financial ratios and macroeconomic variables might give some 
challenges. Especially when the macroeconomic data is from the same period of time as the 
financial statement data the problem of multicollinearity can appear. Multicollinearity is also 
a problem between different macroeconomic variables since they tend to move to the same 
direction. The best results to prove the significance of the macroeconomic variables probably 
come when the financial statement data is old and macroeconomic data is new. For example 
when the financial ratios are from accounting year 1.1.2011 to 31.12.2011 and the 
macroeconomic numbers are from 31.6. 2012, the macroeconomic numbers should give some 
new information of the overall economic situation. 
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5.2. Variables 
The dependent variable is default. The dependent variable is a dummy and is explained by 
five firm specific, financial ratio explanatory variables and four macroeconomic variables. 
Also default history is taken into account of choosing variables. The financial ratio variables 
are control variables that stay in the model all the time. The macroeconomic variables are then 
put into the model of control variables and the model is tested if it’s predictive ability 
increases. 
5.2.1. Dependent variable 
Default is the dependent variable and it is a dummy variable. If the default variable gets a 
value of 1 in some year, it means that it has failed in payments on that given year, or it has 
gone into bankruptcy on that given year. If the firm has gone to bankruptcy it doesn’t have 
any more information after that year. The default variable is collected from years (t+2) and 
(t+3), if the financial ratio data is from year (t). 
Gearing ratio, return on investment, quick ratio and logarithmic net sales and growth rate 
of sales are the firm specific financial ratios I chose to this research. To justify of choosing 
just these four ratios I lean on previous research of Altman, Beaver, Prihti and Laitinen. These 
ratios represent solidity (gearing ratio), profitability (return on Investment) liquidity (quick 
ratio) and volume (net sales). Suomen Asiakastieto Oy is also using these four characteristics 
in credit ratings. The same ratios were used also in another lately made master thesis of Vilma 
Virtanen (2010). Her thesis concerned the significance of adjustments of financial statements. 
Solidity is one of the most important characteristics of describing the firm’s current situation 
concerning the probability of getting into payment difficulties. Erkki Laitinen (2005) find that 
gearing ratio is itself the best single ratio predicting the payment difficulty. In test material, 
as single ratio it classified wrong 30.8 % of poor credit firms (type I error) and 22.0 % of 
successful firms (type II error), what makes an overall result 26.4 % wrongly classified. This 
is, as single ratio predictor, almost as good as other models with many variables. The critical 
value of gearing ratio was 26.64, what means that lower than that are classified as poor credit 
firms. 
Return on investment (ROI) is representing the profitability. This ratio gets its attention also 
in Laitinen’s (2005) research, but as predictor of payment difficulties, it is more like a nice 
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addition to the model and isn’t itself success so well. As single ratio it made type I errors 
34.0 %, type II errors 44.0 % and overall result 39.0 % wrongly classified. 
Quick ratio as single ratio, in Laitinen’s (2005) research, made Type II errors surprising 
66.4 %, but type I errors only 6.8 %. Its overall result was 36.6 % wrongly classified. But 
since the type I errors are considered as much more expensive to the creditor, quick ratio 
seems a very good addition to the model. 
Laitinen (2005) have also made a five ratio logistic multivariable model, in which he chose 
growth of sales %, quick ratio, gearing ratio, income before extraordinary items / current 
liabilities % and logarithmic net sales. From this model he find that after gearing ratio the 
logarithmic net sales also gave important value to the model. Laitinen mention that after 
gearing ratio it is not easy to significantly improve the divination of the model with additional 
variables. It’s good to remember that even slightly improvements can have huge economic 
relevance. 
Growth rate of sales variable is telling if the firm’s orders are growing too fast and does this 
have something to do with payment difficulties. When the firm’s volumes are growing too 
fast the cash flows may not keep up and the firm gets into trouble when it tries to handle all 
the orders. 
5.2.2. Macroeconomic explanatory variables 
Gross ational Income, industry volume, interest rate, consumption, and consumer 
confidence on economy are the macroeconomic variables. I also considered export and 
investment in construction, but left them out at this point. Gross national income, industry 
volume and consumption are 6 to 9 months old information depending on the time it is used. 
Quarterly Interest rate is approximately 1.5 months old information and consumer confidence 
on economy is 1 to 2 month old information. The lag, why the information is not totally 
“fresh,” comes from the time they are collected and the time they are published. When these 
variables are used in predictions, the newest information should be used. 
Industry volume is a percentage number and occurs quarterly. It is a percentage change from 
the corresponding quarter from last year. The value is season equalized and working day fixed 
(Tilastokeskus 2013). This variable might be close correlated to the firm specific values, like 
net sales, but I expect it to give some new information to the older data from firms’ financial 
20 
 
statements. When the financial statement data is approximately 18 months old (Asiakastieto 
2012), this is only 6 to 9 months old. A lot can happen in the economy in over that period. 
Interest rate is a 12 month euribor and it occurs quarterly. It is measured as mean from last 
three month’s euribor (Suomen Pankki 2013). It is also available monthly, but I decided to 
use quarterly mean, because it is not that volatile. 
Consumption is the percentage change in the sum of public- and private spending from last 
quarter. The reason why this is change to last quarter and not to last year like other variables 
is that it’s volatility is very low. (Tilastokeskus 2013). 
Consumer confidence on economy is a combination of four different components. The 
components are consumer’s confidence on her own economic situation after 12 months, 
consumer confidence on national economy (Finland) after 12 months, unemployment after 12 
months and household’s changes to save money after 12 months. This information is collected 
by telephone interviews and is done monthly. The results are published before the end of next 
month (Tilastokeskus 2013). In my research I use quarterly numbers. The consumer 
confidence is a so called latent variable. 
5.3. Working with data 
In analyzing the data I used Excel and Stata. The data collected from Asiakastieto was first in 
Excel form. In Asiakastieto they made a specific data the way I wanted it. It was important to 
think every detail, what kind of data I wanted and in what form. It was nice that they were 
able to make me a complete cross sectional time series data or panel data. The reason why I 
needed the data in a panel form, was my intention to merge the macroeconomic variables like 
industry volumes into the data. Without the macroeconomic variables, a cross sectional data 
from firms’ financial ratios from only one year might have been enough. But for getting some 
variation in the macroeconomic variables, I also needed many years of time series data also. 
Finally the data is converted into panel form in Stata. It is an unbalanced panel data, since in 
many cases the firm specific data does not consider the whole time period. Some firms’ first 
information is after the year 1999 and some firms’ last information is before 2011. Some 
firms have holes in their time series. The reason for these might be foundation of firm, 
bankruptcy, fusion or the firm just doesn’t have given information from some particular year. 
Some observations might also have some error or exceptional cases, and for that, are removed 
from the data. This panel data I call the main panel data.  
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5.3.1. Cleaning financial ratio data 
After cleaning some error and exceptional cases, I focused my attention to the extraordinary 
low- and high ratio values. Because extraordinary low- and high ratio values can cause 
unfavorable movement in mean values, I decided to clean some of them also. Here I have to 
be careful not to clean too much, because the research’s object is to predict payment failures, 
which can be considered a rare phenomenon and quite extreme case also. There might 
however be some ratio values that are exceptionally abnormal, for example, because the 
denominator in the ratio formula is close to zero or just because of an error in data. There 
were also quite many observations that didn’t have a value in all of the ratios so I deleted 
them also.  
There are also some quick ratio values below zero. This might be because the firm’s 
bookkeeper has written some assets or debts into wrong side of the balance sheet, making the 
ratio negative. This can cause quite significant distortion in the ratio mean. The gearing ratio 
values also have some very large negative values. This is probably because the denominator 
(total assets - received in advance) is close to zero and the numerator (equity) is negative. In 
case of gearing ratio I should be cautious, since the weak gearing ratio is considered heavily 
correlated with the possible defaults (Laitinen 2005). 
In cleaning the extremes, I dropped observations when their ratios (sales, quick ratio, ROI, 
gearing ratio) included below 1st and above 99th percentiles or if the value was negative. 
With sales and quick ratio I dropped values below zero and above 99th percentile. With 
gearing ratio I dropped observations below 1st percentile and left the upper tail untouched 
since the highest value 100 is normal and as it should be. This cleaning decreased the number 
of observations by 36231 and left 171477 observations in the data. After cleaning, the ratio 
value extremes look much more realistic. The number of firms decreased by 3259 and left 
31880 firms with five different company types with following frequencies in table 5.1: 
Table 5.1 
Company type Frequency   Defaults 
 
Ay  58  6 
Ky  271  28 
OK  304  12 
Oy  31044  4012 
YEH  203  35 
 
Total:  31880  4093 
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Where Ay is avoin yhtiö, Ky is kommandiittiyhtiö, OK is osuuskunta, Oy is osakeyhtiö and 
YEH is yksityinen elinkeinonharjoittaja. In generally the YEH is the smallest company type, 
usually run by one person and Oy is the largest with more owners and workers. This is though 
only a generalization. 4093 firms had some sort of default mark. That is 12.84 % of all firms. 
A default can be any kind of mark in credit history from light to serious. Also if a firm has 
multiple defaults, in Table 6.1, it is considered as one default. There are many firms in the 
data that have multiple defaults even in one particular year. Maximum number was 129 credit 
defaults in a firm in one particular year. The reason why the defaults are better to deal as 
dummy variable, is that the large numbers could twist the deviation giving too much weight to 
some firms if they are dealt with absolute quantity. 
5.3.2. Defaulted firms by industry 
From different industry there are 13803 firms from construction and 18374 firms from retail. 
In construction, 2262 firms have some sort of defaults mark, what is 16.39 % of all 
construction firms. In retail, 1837 firms have some sort of default mark, what is 10.00 % of all 
retail firms. So, for credit industries, construction seems slightly more risky business than 
retail. The yearly percentage defaults and bankruptcies can be seen in appendix 2. 
In the thirteen years of data, all firms together have 6408 accounting periods that have 
followed a default next year. That is 3.74 % of all accounting periods. In construction there 
are 3611 (5.00 %) and in retail 2797 (2.82 %) accounting periods, that is followed a default 
next year. 
5.3.3. Descriptive statistics of ratios 
In Table 5.1 we saw the total number of firms and the total number of firms with default after 
the cleaning of extreme values. Next I measure the median, 25- and 75 percentiles, mean and 
standard deviation to the ratios of different industry. For getting these statistics from the panel 
data, the panel must be collapsed to a new form, where there are only the main statistic values 
from all firms of given industry per year. For getting new data to both industries I have to 
drop the other industry observations before collapse. After this collapse, the both new data 
consider 13 observations, whose represent the years we have from 1999 to 2011. I call these 
new data the main statistics data from construction and the main statistics data from retail. 
The most important descriptive information of the main statistics data is represented in 
Appendix 2 and next in the Graphs 5.1 and 5.2.  
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In Appendix 2 the ratio mean, median, 25- and 75 percentiles are represented with the 
percentage of firms defaulted and percentage of firms bankrupted next year. In the Graphs 1 
and 2 we can see the visual illustration of mean ratio values and percentage of firms defaulted. 
Graph 5.1 Mean ratio values and percentage of defaulted firms in construction 
 
Graph 5.2 Mean ratio values and percentage of defaulted firms in retail 
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After the collapse, I merged the quarterly macroeconomic variables into the main statistics 
data. The merged data has now 52 quarters of information. The ratio statistics are still yearly, 
and the same values are just represented four times in the four quarters of a given year.  With 
the main ratio statistics and macro values, they can be represented in graphs together. 
5.3.4. Descriptive statistics of macroeconomic variables 
The quarterly macroeconomic variables, volume in industry (construction and retail), interest 
rate (12 month euribor), consumption, consumer confidence on economy and gross national 
income are represented in Graphs 5.3 to 5.6. 
In these graphs we can see the shock in the year 2008, when financial crisis took place all 
over the world. This kind of shock is a good example of random variable that is very hard to 
be prepared in individual firms. Even solid firms with good performance and liquidity can end 
up into payment difficulties and bankruptcy. We can see the quite obvious (negative) 
correlation between the macroeconomic curves and defaulted firms in around 2008, but before 
the financial crisis the correlation is not so obvious. It even looks that they have some sort of 
positive correlation. When the gross national income, consumption and volumes in industries 
are increasing, the percentages of defaulted firms are slowly increasing also. The curve of 
consumer confidence on economy seems to go best along with the curve of defaulted firms. 
The consumer confidence also seems to be the first that react to the upcoming crisis around 
2007 and 2008. Sadly this data has only 13 years of observations starting from 1999. It would 
be nice to see the curves from the recession of early nineties. 
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Graph 5.3 Macroeconomic and percentage of defaulted firms in construction 
 
Graph 5.4 Macroeconomic and percentage of defaulted firms in construction 
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Graph 5.5 Macroeconomic and percentage of defaulted firms in retail 
 
Graph 5.6 Macro economy and percentage of defaulted firms in retail 
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5.4. Regression models 
When we have a situation where we want to consider if some event occurs or not it 
mathematically convenient to define a dichotomous random variable y, which takes a value of 
1 if the event occurs and value of 0 if it does not. We assume that the probability of an event 
depends on a vector of independent variables x* and a vector of unknown parameters θ. Using 
the subscript i to denote the i-th individual we can write the univariate dichotomous model 
generally as 
(1.1) pi ≡ p(yi = 1) = G(xi*,θ), 
i = 1, 2, … , n.  
Equation (1.1) merely states, for example, that the probability that the i-th firm defaults on the 
vector xi* representing the condition of the firm and the economic situation. We will consider 
the problem of choosing the appropriate function G for a given set of data. (Amemiya 1981) 
5.4.1. The linear probability model 
In this case I start choosing the appropriate function for G in (1.1) and begin with a simple 
one explanatory variable linear function 
(1.2) pi ≡ p(yi = 1) = β1 + β2Xi 
Here in (1.2), we have the simplest binary choice model, the linear probability model where, 
as the name implies, the probability of the event occurring, p, is assumed to be a linear 
function of a set of explanatory variables. (Dougherty 2007) 
The dependent variable Yi of observation i is the expected value of Yi, given Xi, 
(1.3) E (Yi | Xi), 
because Y can take only two values. It is 1 with probability pi and 0 with probability (1 – pi). 
Putting this together we get: 
(1.4) E (Yi | Xi) = 1 × pi + 0 × (1 – pi) = pi = β1 + β2Xi. 
The expected value in observation I is therefore β1 + β2Xi. This means that we can rewrite the 
model as 
(1.5) Yi = β1 + β2Xi + ui, 
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where ui is the disturbance term. 
One problem in this simple linear probability model is that is that the predicted probability 
may get values greater than 1 or less than 0 for extreme values of X (Dougherty 2007). Even 
some weaknesses of the model, it is easy to use and gives very understandable results. 
5.4.2. The logit model 
(1.6) Zi = β1 + β2Xi 
Next in (1.6) I suppose that p is a sigmoid (S-shaped) function of Z. Below a certain value of 
Z there is good chance that a firm does not default in near future, and above a certain value, 
the firm is a probable failure. In between, the probability is sensitive to the value of Z. 
(Dougherty 2007) 
Next there is a question what form of mathematical function this p should be. There is no 
definite answer to this. Amemiya (1981) states that the two most popular forms are the 
logistic function, which is used in logit estimation, and the cumulative normal distribution, 
which is used in probit estimation. Both give satisfactory results most of the time and neither 
has any particular advantage. I choose the logistic regression model or the logit model leaning 
on Erkki Laitinen’s researches. 
In the logit model one hypothesizes that the probability of the occurrence of the event is 
determined by the function 
(1.7) pi = F(Zi) = 

  . 
This is a s-shaped function, where p gets values from 0 to 1. As Z tends to infinity,  tends 
to 0 and p has limiting upper bound of 1. As Z tends to minus infinity,  tends to infinity 
and p has limiting lower bound of 0. Hence there is no possibility of getting predictions of the 
probability being greater than 1 or less than 0. 
5.5. Regressions 
In this section I focus on the regressions and issues that relates to them. The regressions are 
run with the firm specific financial ratios using default as dependent variable. Before running 
any regressions I study if there are some differences between industries and the behavior of 
ratios. If the ratios in different industries behave differently, then I have to regress the 
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industries separately. After that I define how I’m going to measure the goodness of the 
models ability to predict defaults. Then I’m starting to run regressions for both industries. 
First I show the regression with ratios only. Then I start to add more independent variables 
into the model. First I add a dummy variable that tells if there are defaults occurred before. 
This variable should be very significant in predicting future defaults. Then I add two dummy 
variables that react on the “too” fast growth or decrease of the sales. Finally I start to study the 
effects of macroeconomic variables. The macroeconomic variables are used as such and also 
as dummy variables defining some economic turning point. After regressions I measure the 
prediction abilities of the regression models and compare the goodness between different 
models. 
In regression, we are most interest of the situation where the default variable is set at time 
(t+2) or later and the financial ratio variables are set at time (t). This is because the case in 
real life is close to this situation. When we are in situation to decide ratings or loans to a firm, 
we are in time (t+1), we have financial ratio data from (t) and we want to know the risks of 
default in future (t+2), (t+3) or even later. I just use years (t+2) and (t+3), because of the quite 
short 13 year period of data. The other reason for not including the default (t+1) into the 
model is the time set of macroeconomic variables. The macroeconomic variables can be used 
for example from a year (t+1) second quarter, when some of the year has already passed. It 
wouldn’t be reasonable to predict the possible already occurred default at early year (t+1). I’ll 
call the year (t+1) as information time lag. This information time lag forms on the lag of 
release of financial statement, lag of analyzing the financial statement information, lag of 
default processed and marked into the systems and lag of the release macroeconomic numbers. 
5.5.1. Testing industry variables 
Before I run regressions with ratios, I study if there are differences between ratios in different 
industries. In studying ratios I look at their distributions and behavior in predicting defaults. 
When looking at the mean values of ratios and defaults next year we can see that there are 
differences. The yearly by industry mean, 25- and 75 percentiles of ratios with defaults next 
year can be seen in appendix 2. Here are the by industry mean values of ratios of whole data 
in table 5.2: 
  
30 
 
Table 5.2 Mean values of ratios and defaults 
Mean estimation 
 
Construction    Retail 
   
variable  Mean Std. Err.      Mean Std. Err.      
   
gearing ratio  38.30714 .1777944 33.09243 .1806616 
roi  18.98686 .128437 15.60471 .1028041       
quick ratio  2.475509 .0147148  2.38586 .0140301 
sales   1117925 3890309 2209688 6304274 
default  .0499993 .000811 .0281797 .0005253       
     
The mean values of ratios in construction are significantly higher than in retail, but so are the 
mean of defaults. The higher ratio values should denote lower probability of default, but in 
comparing the industries this is not the case. The difference can also be seen with the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test where the equality of distributions of ratios is tested. The K-S test 
is used because all the ratios are not normally distributed. The K-S test shows that the null 
hypothesis of equal distributions is rejected with 0.1 percent level. 
Because of the difference of ratio behavior between industries, I have to make the regressions 
of different industries separately. 
5.5.2. Defining the goodness of a regression model 
For getting a prediction model for ratios, I run a regression with default as dependent variable 
and ratios as independent variables. After regression I go through the significance levels of 
the independent variables with t-values. Then I create a prediction value for each observation 
with this model. The prediction value shows how probable it is for a firm getting a default 
after a certain accounting period. 
The prediction number gets values between 0 and 1. In linear regression model, there can 
incorrectly be values below zero and above one in extreme cases. This is a weakness of a 
linear model. The occurred default gets a value of 1 and non-occurred default gets a value of 0. 
The higher the predicted value is the higher probability it is for a firm after a certain 
accounting period for getting a default. The predicted value actually gives a percentage 
probability, because of the dummy 0-1 format of the dependent variable. 
The goodness of the model can be studied, for example, by measuring the mean value of 
predicted value if a default is actually occurred. When the default variable gets value of 1 if 
default occurs, the better the model is in predicting the higher mean value it has among the 
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actually defaulted firms. The extreme cases of the mean of the predicted values, and so the 
model’s predicting ability, are the mean of defaults and 1. When the mean of the predicted 
values is the same as the mean of defaults, it means that the model has no ability to predict at 
all and is the same as a firm is picked by random. The other extreme where the mean of 
predicted values is 1 and defaults are predicted with 100 percent accuracy is not realistically 
possible. The 100 percent predicting accuracy is not realistically possible because for many 
reasons, but one is that there is always a change for even a rating AAA firm to default and 
also for a junk-class C-rated firm to avoid a default. This is good to keep in mind that the 
target is not, because it is not possible, to divide the defaulted firms and non-defaulted with 
100 percent accuracy. The target is to give the firms best possible probabilities in which a 
default may occur in the future. 
One very popular way to study the goodness of the model is to measure the errors it makes. 
Here Type I errors are those defaulted that are below a certain limit of predicted probability 
and Type II errors are those non-defaulted that are above a certain limit of predicted 
probability. This certain limit can be any probability we want to be under investigation. One 
limit could be the mean of predicted value among those actually defaulted. Here I focus more 
on probabilities but I also use the default frequencies. When using the mean of predicted 
value among actually defaulted, then higher the mean of predicted value lower the sum of 
Type I errors. When using the mean of predicted value among actually non-defaulted, then 
the lower the mean of predicted value the lower is the sum of Type II errors. 
The other way of studying the goodness is make different classifications for different default 
probabilities and compare this to actually defaulted firms. These classifications give a wider 
picture of the default probability distribution. The classification method is actually same as 
giving ratings to the firms. For example if a predicted value is 0.005 (very small risk) then 
there should be close to 0.5 percent of actually defaulted firms below and 99.5 percent of 
actually non-defaulted firms above that predicted value 0.005. If the predicted value is 
between 0.005 and 0.02, then the percent of actually defaulted firms should be somewhere in 
the middle of 0.5 and 2 percents of firms. For help to make my own classifications I use the 
rating and default statistics from the Standard & Poor’s document “2011 Annual Global 
Corporate Default Study and Rating Transitions.” We can see that firms rated with A or 
better have defaulted quite rarely even in seven year from the original rating. When we are 
moving to the left to speculative rated firm BBB to CCC/C the risks of get a default rises 
strongly. In rating CCC/C the percentages are surprisingly getting lower, especially when 
more years have gone by. This might be because these C category firms are near bankruptcy 
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so after that they don’t have defaulted because they don’t exist anymore. The S&P’s 
document is seen in table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 
Cumulative Defaulters By Time Horizon Among Global Corporates From Rating  
(1981-2011) 
 
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC/C ;R Total 
Number of issuers defaulting within: 
One year 
  
10 66 173 885 1716 113 2,963 
Three years 
 
7 43 162 515 1950 2080 264 5,021 
Five years 
 
11 67 253 794 2549 2164 340 6,178 
Seven years 2 19 93 336 978 2834 2192 391 6,845 
Total 9 71 266 592 1365 3213 2227 497 8,240 
Percent of total defaults per time frame: 
One year 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.2 5.8 29.9 57.9 3.8 
 
Three years 0.0 0.1 0.9 3.2 10.3 38.8 41.4 5.3 
 
Five years 0.0 0.2 1.1 4.1 12.9 41.3 35.0 5.5 
 
Seven years 0.0 0.3 1.4 4.9 14.3 41.4 32.0 5.7 
 
Total 0.1 0.9 3.2 7.2 16.6 39.0 27.0 6.0 
 
 
Sources: Standard & Poor's Global Fixed Income Research and Standard & Poor's 
CreditPro®. 
 
I use this S&P’s table and also information from Suomen Asiakastieto to make my own risk 
classifications. Instead naming the ratings with letters I show the percentages of risks in my 5 
level classifications so it is easy to see how the default predictions work. Predicting the year 
(t+2) and (t+3) defaults with accounting period (t) financial ratios, I use the following table 
5.4 for the predicted value distributions: 
Table 5.4 
Risk  Predicted probability of default in years (t+2) and (t+3) 
 
Very small risk         p  ≤  0.5 
Small risk  0.5< p  ≤  2     
Moderate risk  2   < p  ≤  7   
High risk  7   < p  ≤  27 
Very high risk  27 < p  
 
Reading the previous studies of Altman, Beaver, Laitinen, Prihti and others, they have created 
a data of two groups with same number of firms in both of them. In first group there are the 
healthy firms and in the second the defaulted firms. Then they have compared how the models 
improve their prediction ability from just random 50-50 probability. This seems to be quite 
used method in the area. It makes very readable and understandable answers, but at the same 
time it loses some credibility in statistics because the data is manipulated. I’m not using this 
kind of pair-sample method. 
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Before the regressions are introduced there has to be left out some observations. Because the 
macroeconomic variables for some of the quarters are from the year (t+1), when ratios are 
from year (t), the regressions with macroeconomic variables have less observations.  There 
are exactly 40087 observations that must to be left for regression of ratios. These observations 
are those that don’t have an observation for next year. This is of course removes those firms 
that have bankrupted on the first year they have given data. This is good to keep in mind but 
not necessary make the results worse, because now the regressions considers more on the 
firms that have been existed more than one year. Here in table 5.5 are default frequencies and 
percentages at (t+1) and at (t+2) or (t+3). 
Table 5.5 Default frequencies and percentages at (t+1) and at (t+2) or (t+3) 
Period (t+1)   Period (t+2) or (t+3) 
Industry Default Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent 
Total 0 128,200 97.57  124,994 95.13 
1 3,190 2.43  6,396 4.87 
Construct. 0 53,623 96.79  51,859 93.61 
 1 1,776 3.21  3,540 6.39 
Retail 0 74,577 98.14  73,135 96.24 
1 1,414 1.86  2,856 3.76 
 
In evaluating the goodness of the models I first look out regression outputs and check the t –
values of variables. Then I check that the values and signs of coefficients are reasonable. The 
number of observations is large enough so I shouldn’t have to worry about that. If everything 
looks fine I can focus on the goodness of the model, which is its ability to predict defaults. 
Finding out which model is the best to predict I look the mean of predicted value among 
actually defaulted and non-defaulted. After that I look at the risk distribution of the predicted 
value. The results of regressions A, B and C are seen in tables 5.25 to 5.28. 
5.5.3. Linear regression with financial ratios only 
Table 5.6 Regression A. default with ratios in construction 
Regression A     F(  4, 55394) = 592.02 
Construction     R-squared     =  0.0410
      
default (t+1),(t+2) Coefficient Std. Err. t Mean of predicted 
     value among: 
gearing ratio  -.0010765 .0000276 -38.95  
roi  -.0002475 .0000328 -7.56 defaulted .1022773 
quick ratio  -.0009924 .0003176 -3.12 non-defaulted .0675164 
logsales  -.0007408 .0005455 -1.36  
_cons  .1241098 .0068593 18.09  
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Table 5.7 Regression A. default with ratios in retail 
Regression A     F(  4, 75986) =  539.94 
Retail     R-squared     =  0.0276 
  
default (t+1),(t+2) Coefficient Std. Err. t Mean of predicted 
     value among:  
gearing ratio  -.0005329 .0000153 -34.81   
roi  -.0002599 .0000234 -11.13 defaulted .0641821 
quick ratio  -.0007284 .000191 -3.81 non-defaulted .0335313 
logsales  -.0017328 .0003074 -5.64  
_cons  .0851499 .0040042 21.27  
 
Here we can see the regression model A, where only financial ratios are represented. We can 
see that the ratios in both industries have same sort of significance levels (values). The most 
significant ratio is the gearing ratio, which have t-values -38.95 and 34.81 in construction and 
retail respectively. Second significant is the return on investment and third the quick ratio. 
The logarithm of sales is quite significant on retail but in construction the t-value is only -1.36. 
In regressions B and C I have dropped the logarithm of sales and used only the first three 
ratios. 
In right hand side we can see the mean of predicted value among actually defaulted and non-
defaulted. We can use these numbers when we are measuring the goodness of regression B 
and see if the prediction ability is improved after adding the variables of history of defaults 
and sales growth over 70 % per year. 
5.5.4. Regression with already occurred default and growth variable added 
Table 5.8 Regression B. default with ratios, sales growth >70 % and history of defaults 
Regression B     F(  5, 55393) = 1399.64 
Construction     R-squared     =  0.1122 
       
default (t+1),(t+2) Coefficient Std. Err. t Mean of predicted
     value among:  
default history (t),(t-1) .4324929 .0064986 66.55  
gearing ratio  -.0008216 .0000269 -30.58 defaulted .168899 
roi  -.0002765 .0000311 -8.90 non-defaulted .0567326 
quick ratio  -.0010109 .0003026 -3.34  
sales growth >70% .0219682 .003578 6.14  
_cons  .0930437 .0015137 61.47   
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Table 5.9 Regression B. default with ratios, sales growth >70 % and history of defaults 
Regression B     F(  5, 75985) = 1231.61 
Retail     R-squared =  0.0750
       
default (t+1),(t+2) Coefficient Std. Err. t Mean of predicted
     value among:  
default history (t),(t-1) .3551466 .0056715 62.62  
gearing ratio  -.0004494 .0000149 -30.10 defaulted .1097334 
roi  -.0002696 .0000225 -11.97 non-defaulted .0347659 
quick ratio  -.0005263 .0001836 -2.87  
sales growth >70% .0050641 .0023517 2.15  
_cons  .0540943 .0009228 58.62   
 
Here above we can see the regression B where sales growth over 70 % and history of defaults 
variables are added. We can see that the significance levels of the ratios have stayed quite 
stable. The default history variable which takes into account defaults from year (t) and (t-1) 
seems to have very significant role in the model. After adding the default history into the 
model it is quite hard to improve the prediction ability. This makes a good sense why 
payment failure registers are so much used. Also sales growth >70% seem to have some role 
in both industries. When a firm is  
In the right hand side we can again see the mean of predicted values among actually defaulted 
and non-defaulted. We can see that the regression B work much better when we are looking 
the predicted mean value among defaulted, but among non-defaulted only in construction it 
has lower value, when in retail it actually has higher value than regression A. In result tables 
5.25 to 5.28 we can though see also the risk classifications and we can see that regression B 
works much better than regression A. 
5.5.5. Regression with macroeconomic variables 
There are numerous methods to use macroeconomic variables in prediction models. The 
macroeconomic variables can be used alone, all together, integrated together as categorical- or 
dichotomous variable, it can be used as integration variable with ratios or there can be used a 
method of primary component analysis. I’m going to make regressions with multiple ways 
and try to find the most valuable method. 
Before I do any regressions I have to clarify how I’m going to use different quarterly 
macroeconomic values with ratios and defaults. So as described before the default is used at 
time (t+2) and (t+3) when ratios are used at time (t). But when we are adding the 
macroeconomic variables, we have to think when we have the macroeconomic data available 
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in real life compared to the financial ratio data. Here is next in table 5.10 a list of the periods 
used at different quarters. 
Table 5.10 
Quarter Ratios at year Default history from year Macroeconomic variables at year 
 
1 t t and t-1  t+1 
2 t t and t-1  t+1 
3 t t and t-1  t+1 
4 t t and t-1  t 
       
Let’s consider that we are living at year (t+1) and the third quarter has just started. At this 
point we have the financial data from year (t) and we macroeconomic data from 1
st
 quarter of 
year (t+1). We want to use the newest information so this data is what we are using. The 
quarterly macroeconomic data is available about 3 months after the quarter has ended 
(Tilastokeskus). The financial ratio data should also be available after about 3 months from 
the end of last accounting period (year). The 4
th
 quarter’s macroeconomic data is from the 
same year (t) as the financial ratio data. This is because when the macroeconomic data from 
the 4
th
 quarter from year (t) is available after 3 months, the newest financial ratio data from 
year (t) should also be available. 
The most valuable and credible regression method founded was the one that included all the 
macroeconomic variables in one dummy variable. This dummy variable gets a value 1, if at 
least three out of four macroeconomic dummy variables get a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
These four macroeconomic variables and the combined macroeconomic dummy variable are 
represented in table 5.11 below. Sorensen & Whitta-Jacobsen (2010) describes in their text 
book (p.358), that business cycles are characterized by a co-movement of a large number of 
economic activities and not just by movements in a single variable like real GDP. 
When studying the regressions with financial ratios and macroeconomic variables when 
financial ratios where dealt all together but separately as own variables, the results are not so 
clear. The significance level of macroeconomic variables vary between  
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Table 5.11. Macroeconomic variables 
Macroeconomic variable Value description  Dummy gets values: 
a. Gross national income % change to same quarter last year  1, "# $ < 00 '(ℎ*+",
- 
b. Industry volume % change to same quarter last year  1, "# $ < 00 '(ℎ*+",
- 
c. Consumption % change to last quarter   1, "# $ < 00 '(ℎ*+",
- 
d. Consumer confidence Descriptive number   1, "# $ < 120 '(ℎ*+",
- 
    on economy 
Combined macro- Combined from variables above 1, "# / + 1 + 2 + 3 > 20 '(ℎ*+",
- 
economic dummy 
variable 
 
Table 5.12. Regression with economic downturn dummy variable 
Regression C.     F(  6, 55392) = 1206.37 
Construction     R-squared     =  0.1156 
Ratiodata available from (t) 
Macrodata available from (t+1) 1
st
 quarter   Mean of predicted 
     value among:  
default (t+1),(t+2) Coefficient Std. Err. t  
     defaulted .1720859 
default history (t),(t-1) .4297769 .0064889 66.23 non-defaulted .0565151 
gearing ratio  -.0008193 .0000268 -30.55   
roi  -.0002471 .0000311 -7.96  
quick ratio  -.0011912 .0003022 -3.94  
sales growth >70% .0231638 .0035721 6.48  
economic downturn .0332713 .0022785 14.60  
_cons  .0845546 .0016188 52.23  
 
Table 5.13. Regression with economic downturn dummy variable 
Regression C.     F(  6, 55392) = 1184.88 
Construction     R-squared     =  0.1137 
Ratiodata available from (t) 
Macrodata available from (t+1) 2
nd
 quarter   Mean of predicted 
     value among: 
default (t+1),(t+2) Coefficient Std. Err. t  
     defaulted .1703778 
default history (t),(t-1) .4318726 .0064932 66.51 non-defaulted .0566317 
gearing ratio  -.0008183 .0000269 -30.47   
roi  -.0002757 .000031 -8.88  
quick ratio  -.0010786 .0003024 -3.57  
sales growth >70% .0222684 .003575 6.23  
economic downturn .0302121 .0030405 9.94  
_cons  .0894924 .001554 57.59 
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Table 5.14. Regression with economic downturn dummy variable 
Regression C.     F(  6, 55392) = 1203.45 
Construction     R-squared     =  0.1153 
Ratiodata available from (t) 
Macrodata available from (t+1) 3
rd
 quarter   Mean of predicted 
     value among: 
default (t+1),(t+2) Coefficient Std. Err. t  
     defaulted .1718543 
default history (t),(t-1) .4319351 .0064872 66.58 non-defaulted .0565309 
gearing ratio  -.0008147 .0000268 -30.37   
roi  -.0002809 .000031 -9.06   
quick ratio  -.0011101 .0003021 -3.67  
sales growth >70% .0224221 .0035719 6.28  
economic downturn .0330701 .0023521 14.06  
_cons  .0857129 .0015984 53.62  
 
Table 5.15. Regression with economic downturn dummy variable 
Regression C.     F(  6, 55392) = 1184.88 
Construction     R-squared     =  0.1137 
Ratiodata available from (t) 
Macrodata available from (t) 4
th
 quarter   Mean of predicted 
     value among:  
default (t+1),(t+2) Coefficient Std. Err. t  
     defaulted .1703778 
default history (t),(t-1) .4318726 .0064932 66.51 non-defaulted .0566317 
gearing ratio  -.0008183 .0000269 -30.47   
roi  -.0002757 .000031 -8.88  
quick ratio  -.0010786 .0003024 -3.57  
sales growth >70% .0222684 .003575 6.23  
economic downturn .0302121 .0030405 9.94  
_cons  .0894924 .001554 57.59   
 
Table 5.16. Regression with economic downturn dummy variable 
Regression C.     F(  6, 75984) = 1043.90 
Retail     R-squared     =  0.0762 
Ratiodata available from (t) 
Macrodata available from (t+1) 1
st
 quarter   Mean of predicted 
     value among:  
default (t+1),(t+2) Coefficient Std. Err. t  
     defaulted .1108745 
default history (t),(t-1) .3544619 .0056683 62.53 non-defaulted .0347213 
gearing ratio  -.000448 .0000149 -30.03   
roi  -.0002655 .0000225 -11.79  
quick ratio  -.0005566 .0001835 -3.03  
sales growth >70% .0058018 .0023513 2.47  
economic downturn .0215534 .0021826 9.87  
_cons  .0517618 .000952 54.37   
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Table 5.17. Regression with economic downturn dummy variable 
Regression C.     F(  6, 75984) = 1043.90 
Retail     R-squared     =  0.0762 
Ratiodata available from (t) 
Macrodata available from (t+1) 2
nd
 quarter   Mean of predicted 
     value among:  
default (t+1),(t+2) Coefficient Std. Err. t  
     defaulted .1108745 
default history (t),(t-1) .3544619 .0056683 62.53 non-defaulted .0347213 
gearing ratio  -.000448 .0000149 -30.03  
roi  -.0002655 .0000225 -11.79  
quick ratio  -.0005566 .0001835 -3.03  
sales growth >70% .0058018 .0023513 2.47  
economic downturn .0215534 .0021826 9.87  
_cons  .0517618 .000952 54.37  
 
Table 5.18. Regression with economic downturn dummy variable 
Regression C.     F(  6, 75984) = 1062.21 
Retail     R-squared     =  0.0774 
Ratiodata available from (t) 
Macrodata available from (t+1) 3
rd
 quarter   Mean of predicted 
     value among:  
default (t+1),(t+2) Coefficient Std. Err. t  
     defaulted .1120608 
default history (t),(t-1) .3545851 .0056642 62.60 non-defaulted .034675 
gearing ratio  -.000445 .0000149 -29.84  
roi  -.0002676 .0000225 -11.89  
quick ratio  -.0005874 .0001834 -3.20  
sales growth >70% .0063671 .0023504 2.71  
economic downturn .0232666 .0016487 14.11  
_cons  .0491978 .0009847 49.96  
 
Table 5.19. Regression with economic downturn dummy variable 
Regression C.     F(  6, 75984) = 1043.90 
Retail     R-squared     =  0.0774 
Ratiodata available from (t) 
Macrodata available from (t) 4
th
 quarter   Mean of predicted 
     value among:  
default (t+1),(t+2) Coefficient Std. Err. t  
     defaulted .1108745 
default history (t),(t-1) .3544619 .0056683 62.53 non-defaulted .0347213 
gearing ratio  -.000448 .0000149 -30.03  
roi  -.0002655 .0000225 -11.79  
quick ratio  -.0005566 .0001835 -3.03  
sales growth >70% .0058018 .0023513 2.47  
economic downturn .0215534 .0021826 9.87  
_cons  .0517618 .000952 54.37  
 
From the regression C outputs we can see that the control variables (regression B) still has 
same kind of role in the model. The macroeconomic variable called economic downturn has 
also significant role in both industries and in all quarters. The results of mean of predicted 
values among actually defaulted and non-defaulted are represented in tables 5.25 to 5.28. 
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5.5.6. Results of regression B with macroeconomic variables added one by one 
First I introduce the macroeconomic variables individually with control group of financial 
ratio variables, occurred defaults and too fast growth of sales. The mean of predicted values 
among actually defaulted are compared to the corresponding values of regression B. This tells 
if the added variable give new prediction value. The mean of predicted value among actually 
non-defaulted is left aside at this point, because the changes in the value are so small. 
Table 5.20 
Gross national income percentage change to last year corresponding quarter 
     Mean of predicted value 
Variable time serie coefficient std. error t –value among actually defaulted 
Construction      Reg. B 
      .168899 
gni4  (t) Q4 -.0026241 .0002558 -10.26 .1704746 
gni1  (t+1) Q1 -.0025111 .0002007 -12.51 .1712411 
gni2  (t+2) Q2 -.0023131 .0002791 -8.29 .1699285 
gni3  (t+3) Q3 -.0044185 .000328 -13.47 .1716129 
 
Retail      Reg. B 
      .1097334 
gni4  (t) Q4 -.0017007 .0001848 -9.20 .110725 
gni1  (t+1) Q1 -.0016578 .00014 -11.84 .1113736 
gni2  (t+2) Q2 -.0016127 .0001948 -8.28 .1105357 
gni3  (t+3) Q3 -.0030555 .0002286 -13.37 .1118227 
 
In table 5.20 we can see the macroeconomic variable of gross national income. From t-values 
we can see that the variable is significant and it negatively correlates with the future defaults. 
From the predicted mean values among actually defaulted we can see that GNI alone gives 
some new value to the regression B. No clear difference between industries. 
Table 5.21 
Consumer confidence on economy (dummy variable) 
1 if x < 12 , 0 if x ≥ 12 
     Mean of predicted value 
Variable time serie coefficient  std. error t –value among actually defaulted 
Construction      Reg. B 
      .168899 
confidum4  (t) Q4 .0043965 .0023095 1.90 .1689533 
confidum1  (t+1) Q1 .0120169 .0025539 4.71 .169231 
confidum2  (t+2) Q2 .0049767 .0019672 2.53 .168995 
confidum3  (t+3) Q3 .0010727 .0019991 0.54 .1689033 
 
Retail      Reg. B 
      .1097334 
confidum4  (t) Q4 .0034131 .0015464 2.21 .1097905 
confidum1  (t+1) Q1 .0084826 .0017478 4.85 .1100093 
confidum2  (t+2) Q2 .0037336 .0013344 2.80 .1098251 
confidum3  (t+3) Q3 .0013819 .0013593 1.02 .1097455 
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In table 5.21 we can see the macroeconomic variable of consumer confidence on economy, 
which is represented in dummy form. The dummy form is used because the consumer 
confidence is a descriptive number. From t –values we can see that it is merely significant and 
the actual consumer confidence variable (not the dummy) correlates negatively with future 
defaults. The t –values are quite low in this kind of large data, so using this variable alone 
might not be recommended. With other variables as integration variable this might give some 
information to the current macroeconomic state. From predicted values among actually 
defaulted we can see that there might be some value in this variable for making the regression 
model B better. No clear difference between industries. 
Table 5.22 
Consumption percentage change to last quarter 
     Mean of predicted value 
Variable time serie coefficient std. error t –value among actually defaulted 
Construction       Reg. B 
      .168899 
consuq4  (t) Q4 -.0189688 .0016828 -11.27 .1708009 
consuq1  (t+1) Q1 -.0005356 .0009406 -0.57 .1689038 
consuq2  (t+2) Q2 -.0097701 .0011915 -8.20 .1699065  
consuq3  (t+3) Q3 -.0078001 .0012845 -6.07 .1694519 
 
Retail      Reg. B 
      .1097334 
consuq4  (t) Q4 -.0128375 .0011742 -10.93 .1111316 
consuq1  (t+1) Q1 -.000042 .0006653 -0.06 .1097335 
consuq2  (t+2) Q2 -.0062477 .0008215 -7.61 .1104106 
consuq3  (t+3) Q3 -.0049692 .0008713 -5.70 .1101144 
 
In table 5.22 we can see the macroeconomic variable of consumption. From t- values we can 
see that it is significant except in (t+1) Q1. This might be because the growth of consumption 
has been quite stable in the whole period. The only small decline in consumption is in 2008 
financial crisis. This low volatility is also the reason why this variable is measured as 
percentage change to last quarter and not to last year corresponding quarter as the other 
variables are. In any case I call this variable significant and it negatively correlates with future 
defaults. From predicted mean values among actually defaulted we can see that this variable 
gives some new value to the regression B. No clear difference between industries. 
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Table 5.23 
Industry volume percentage change to last year corresponding quarter 
     Mean of predicted value 
Variable time serie coefficient std. error t –value among actually defaulted 
Construction       Reg. B 
      .168899 
conq4y  (t) Q4 -.0009582 .000117 -8.19 .1699043 
conq1y  (t+1) Q1 -.001756 .0001799 -9.76 .1703262 
conq2y (t+2) Q2 -.0008691 .0001733 -5.01 .1692761 
conq3y (t+3) Q3 -.0006356 .0001495 -4.25 .16917 
 
Retail      Reg. B 
      .1097334 
retq4y (t) Q4 -.0002381 .0001157 -2.06 .1097831 
retq1y (t+1) Q1 -.0004094 .0001161 -3.52 .109879 
retq2y (t+2) Q2 -.0003372 .0001015 -3.32 .1098627 
retq3y (t+3) Q3 -.0003634 .0000978 -3.72                .1098952 
 
In table 5.23 we can see the macroeconomic variable of industry volume. This variable is 
different number in industries. From t –values we can see that the variable is significant and 
negatively correlates with the future defaults. There is some quite remarkable difference 
between industries. The construction firms correlate much stronger to the changes in industry 
volumes. From the predicted mean values among actually defaulted we can see that there is 
some improvement to the regression B. 
Table 5.24 
Interest rate (euribor) 
     Mean of predicted value 
Variable time serie coefficient std. error t –value among actually defaulted 
Construction       Reg. B 
      .168899 
eurq4  (t) Q4 .0024973 .0007825 3.19 .1690518   
eurq1  (t+1) Q1 -.0025312 .0008813 -2.87 .1690227 
eurq2  (t+2) Q2 -.0025546 .0007567 -3.38 .1690699 
eurq3  (t+3) Q3 -.0020697 .0006992 -2.96 .1690304   
 
Retail      Reg. B 
      .1097334 
eurq4  (t) Q4 .0018677 .0005446 3.43 .1098712 
eurq1  (t+1) Q1 -.0013278 .0006019 -2.21 .1097904 
eurq2  (t+2) Q2 -.0013848 .0005163 -2.68 .1098177 
eurq3  (t+3) Q3 -.0010852 .0004787 -2.27 .1097936 
 
In table 5.24 we can see the macroeconomic variable of interest rate. From t –values we can 
see that it is not very significant, especially when take into account that (t) Q4 has positive 
coefficient when others are negative. Maybe this variable could give some information, but it 
might require more study of how it affects to the economy and to the default rates. Also 
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different time lags could be considered. Although it seems to give some value to the 
regression B, I leave it out from my final model. No clear difference between industries. 
From the regression models, where the macroeconomic variables are used individually one by 
one we have seen that they are giving some new value to the model. There is however a small 
problem when we want to use these variables together. Many of them are strongly correlated 
with each other causing a problem of collinearity. A solution to this problem is to use them 
together in one variable. This is exactly what have been done in regression C, where four 
macroeconomic variables are turned into one dummy variable. There is also a little bit more 
sophisticated way to do it called primary component analysis, where many variables are 
brought together in one variable using different weights. I’m leaving this out of my research. 
5.5.7. Result of regression models A, B and C 
Here I introduce the results of the regressions A, B and C in one packet. Regression A with 
financial ratios. Regression B with financial ratios, dummy of growth of sales and default 
history from years’ (t) and (t-1). Regression C includes same as Regression B, but also a 
macroeconomic dummy variable that represents possible economic downturn. The results are 
from the linear regression model and from the logit regression model. We compare the 
different regressions and see if they get better when we are moving down from regression A 
to C. We also look if the “freshness” of the macroeconomic variable has some significance. 
The lowest regression C has the most fresh macroeconomic data available from (t+1) Q3. 
The interpretation of the results in tables 5.25, 5.26, 5.27 and 5.28 has four dimensions. First 
we take a look at the mean of predicted value among actually defaulted. The value is 
calculated from the predicted values that are between 0 to 1, if ignore some extreme cases 
below zero in the linear regression model. In this case there are no values over 1 because of 
the mean value of defaults is so low. Anyhow this problem is solved in using the logit 
regression model also. When the firm is defaulted the default (dependent) variable gets a 
value of 1. So among those that are defaulted, the better the result is, the closer the predicted 
value is to 1. The larger the value is the smaller is the risk for Type I errors. 
Second we take a look at mean of predicted value among actually non-defaulted. The lower 
value it gets the better the model has worked and smaller is the risk for Type II errors. Third 
we look at the percentages of risk classifications and how the regression model has distributed 
the firms by their risk from the actual risk probabilities chart. The value is better the better it 
fits in between the percentages around p. The most attention gets the low and high p –values 
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since they tell something how the model has distributed the low and high risk firms in the 
right categories. Finally fourth we look at the number of defaulted in risk categories and see 
the frequencies how the regression model has distributed the firms in the risk categories. 
Table 5.25 Results of regression models’ default prediction abilities (linear model) 
Linear regression  Construction 
 
Regression Mean of 
& quarter predicted value 
of macro among actually: Actual risk probabilities % 
variable defaulted            p≤0.5 0.5<p≤2 2<p≤7 7<p≤27 27p>0.27
   
A .1022773      1.23            1.40           3.23          11.82 20.99 
B .168899      1.12  1.27 3.56 11.19  48.44 
C (t) Q4 .1703778      1.07  1.24 3.61 11.13  48.51 
C (t+1) Q1 .1720859      1.04 1.41 3.59 11.21  48.32 
C (t+1) Q2 .1703778      1.07 1.24 3.61 11.13  48.51 
C (t+1) Q3 .1718543      1.02 1.38 3.57 11.20  48.68 
  
   Number of defaulted in risk categories 
 non-defaulted      p≤0.5 0.5<p≤2 2<p≤7 7<p≤27 27p>0.27 
 
A .0675164      36 82 797 2540 85 
B .0567326      35 88 1029 1676 712 
C (t) Q4 .0566317      41 84 1020 1677 718 
C (t+1) Q1 .0565151      48 93 991 1690 718 
C (t+1) Q2 .0566317      41 84 1020 1677 718 
C (t+1) Q3 .0565309      47 92 978 1703 720 
 
Table 5.26 Results of regression models’ default prediction abilities (logit model) 
Logit regression  Construction 
 
Regression Mean of 
& quarter predicted value 
of macro among actually: Actual risk probabilities % 
variable defaulted            p≤0.5 0.5<p≤2 2<p≤7 7<p≤27 27p>0.27
   
A .1001041      1.89            1.36 3.47          12.42 22.84 
B .1690754      1.72  1.26 3.81 12.34 47.23 
C (t) Q4 .1712586      1.51  1.19 3.85 12.38 47.38 
C (t+1) Q1 .173694      1.45 1.22 3.86 12.22 47.93 
C (t+1) Q2 .1712586      1.51 1.19 3.85 12.38  47.38 
C (t+1) Q3 .1733425      1.29 1.21 3.84 12.32  47.53 
  
   Number of defaulted in risk categories 
 non-defaulted      p≤0.5 0.5<p≤2 2<p≤7 7<p≤27 27p>0.27 
 
A .0614287      21 51 1111 2233 124 
B .0567206      17 55 1446 1305 717 
C (t) Q4 .0565716      15 55 1455 1292 723 
C (t+1) Q1 .0564053      15 61 1439 1294 731 
C (t+1) Q2 .0565716      15 55 1455 1292 723 
C (t+1) Q3 .0564293      13 62 1423 1320 722 
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In tables 5.25 and 5.26 we can see the results of linear and logit regression models’ default 
prediction abilities in construction. The regression models seem to get better when we add 
new significant variables.  
From regression A to B the prediction ability increases seemingly when previous defaults of 
year (t) and (t-1) and dummy variable of fast sales growth are added. The mean of predicted 
value among actually defaulted increases significantly in both models. The mean p of non-
defaulted is also decreased seemingly and though reduces the risk of Type II errors. Also the 
risk classifications look much better in regression B. Both the very small risk and very high 
risk actual probabilities look seemingly closer to the p –class they should be. The frequencies 
are also seemingly better distributed. Regression A is almost unable to classify the very high 
risk firms’ p>0.27. One unexpected observation is the higher values in p <0.005 than in 
0.005<p≤0.02 in the logit model. In linear regression model this doesn’t occur. Here is one 
example where the linear model might fail. The reason why this happens is probably the 
possibility the linear model to get values below zero. If we look at the frequencies we see that 
the linear model has accepted much more firms in the very small risk class than the logit 
model. This speak something about that the linear model treats the p -value 0.005 like it is 
actually higher. This is because there are values below zero and thus more than 5 % of 
observations below the p<0.005. For this reason I trust more in the logit model and base 
the assumptions of the results on that and leave the linear model on less attention. 
From regression model B to C we also can see some improvement. The change is not large, 
but there seem to be some. The mean of predicted value among defaulted and non-defaulted is 
better in all quarters and the best predicted value is in year (t+1) 1
st
 quarter. Also the very 
small risk class probabilities improved slightly from B to C. In fourth quarter of regression C 
the actual precentage risk in very small risk category improves to 1.29 from 1.72 from 
regression B. This is almost 0.5 % and can be seen quite large change, because the category 
itself is 0.5 % wide. In the very high risk class there is also little improvement. The 
percentages may not tell much, but the frequencies tell that the macroeconomic variable have 
found few more very high risk firms comparing to regression B. 
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Table 5.27. Results of regression models’ default prediction abilities (linear model) 
Linear regression  Retail 
 
Regression 
& quarter Mean of predicted value  
of macro among actually: Actual risk probabilities % 
variable defaulted     p≤0.5 0.5<p≤2 2<p≤7 7<p≤27  p>27
   
A .0641821     0.79 1.06  3.80  12.40 4.44 
B .1097334     0.89 1.02  3.64  11.69  41.21 
C (t) Q4 .1108745     0.75 1.10  3.62  11.46  41.21 
C (t+1) Q1 .1108745     0.75  1.10  3.62    11.46 41.21 
C (t+1) Q2 .1108745     0.75  1.10   3.62 11.46 41.21 
C (t+1) Q3 .1120608     0.70  1.10  3.59 11.54 41.21 
 
   Number of defaulted in risk categories 
 non-defaulted      p≤0.5 0.5<p≤2 2<p≤7 7<p≤27  p>27
  
A .0335313     54 165 1767 868 2 
B .0347659     65 184 1648 518 441 
C (t) Q4 .0347213     63 192 1605 555 441 
C (t+1) Q1 .0347213     63 192 1605 555 441 
C (t+1) Q2 .0347213     63 192 1605 555 441 
C (t+1) Q3 .034675     67 184 1562 602 441 
 
Table 5.27. Results of regression models’ default prediction abilities (logit model) 
Logit regression  Retail 
 
Regression 
& quarter Mean of predicted value  
of macro among actually: Actual risk probabilities % 
variable defaulted     p≤0.5 0.5<p≤2 2<p≤7 7<p≤27  p>27
   
A .0628406     0.91 1.01  3.73  13.24 12.46 
B .1113446     0.84 1.06 3.54 13.07 38.24 
C (t) Q4 .1130827     0.79 1.06 3.57 12.43 38.52 
C (t+1) Q1 .1130827     0.79 1.06 3.57    11.43 38.52 
C (t+1) Q2 .1130827     0.79  1.06 3.57 11.43 38.52 
C (t+1) Q3 .1146744     0.76 1.01 3.58 12.68 38.39 
 
   Number of defaulted in risk categories 
 non-defaulted      p≤0.5 0.5<p≤2 2<p≤7 7<p≤27  p>27
  
A .0365971     28 152 1953 684 39 
B .0347029     24 191 1793 440 408 
C (t) Q4 .0346351     23 203 1754 470 406 
C (t+1) Q1 .0346351     23 203 1754 470 406 
C (t+1) Q2 .0346351     23 203 1754 470 406 
C (t+1) Q3 .0345729     23 208 1689 531 405 
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In retail in tables 5.27 and 5.28 there are similar improvements from regression A to B as in 
the case of construction. This difference is quite obvious and so I move on studying the 
regression C. One reason why I chose to take regression A into this paper is to show how the 
prediction ability improves when new significant variables are added.  
Comparing regressions from B to C small improvement in mean of actually defaulted and 
non-defaulted can be observed. The best results are in regression C (t+1) Q3, where also the 
p<0.005 has the smallest value 0.0076 comparing to the regression B 0.0084. This gives some 
support for the hypothesis H3. Even that the differences seems quite small they might have 
some value. If we look at the table 5.3 we see default percentages and probabilities of 
Standard & Poor’s credit ratings. The default percentages and frequencies are very small in 
AAA and AA rated firms and even a 0.1 % change in default probability can change the 
whole credit rating of a firm. 
The reason why the quarterly predicted values have similar answers in retail is that the 
macroeconomic variable is a dummy and react only very rare situations. It has same values in 
same years of quarters Q4, (t+1) Q1 and Q2 so the results are also identical. 
5.5.8. Correlation between variables 
The coefficient of correlation will get values between -1 and +1. If correlation coefficient is 
equal to 1, the variables are perfectly positive correlated and move though to the same 
direction all the time. If correlation coefficient is equal to -1, the variables are perfectly 
negatively correlated and move though to the opposite direction all the time. If correlation 
coefficient is equal to 0, the variables have no systematic relationship. Other values between -
1 and +1 indicate that they have some negative or positive correlation and they have co-
movement to the same or opposite direction. If the variables are highly correlated with each 
other, there might rise a problem of collinearity. In the situation of collinearity it is hard to 
find out which one of the variables is causing the changes in the dependent variable. There 
can be seen some quite strong correlation between the macroeconomic variables. This is why 
the macroeconomic variables should be treated together in one variable, either with very 
simple method like I combine them into one dummy variable or in more complex forms like 
in primary component analysis. 
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6. Testing regression model to test data 
Testing the regression models on out-of-sample test data found to be difficult, because the 
appropriate data was not available. I have some data from firms’ financial ratios and defaults. 
This data is from year 1991 to year 1998. First problem of the test data was that the equations 
of ratios are different and are not comparable with the sample data. Second problem is that the 
early nineties there are only few firms’ information available. Also those firms that are 
available are much larger firms than those in the sample data. The reason for the second 
problem is that the financial data was not gathered with the same way and quantities as are 
done nowadays. Third problem concerns the macroeconomic data. The consumer confidence 
information is available from 1995. This data could be easily manipulated to the dummy form, 
because the confidence was probably not very high in the early nineties. 
All in all, the target of this paper was to evaluate the benefits of adding macroeconomic 
variables into the regression model of financial ratios and other background information like 
already occurred defaults. The possibility of having a change to evaluate these benefits needs 
an appropriate data. This data should of course have comparable variables, but also strong 
macroeconomic variation of shock(s). These shocks could be the financial crisis started in 
2008 or the depression in Finland early nineties. 
If I had test data I would have used the regression models B and C. I would have used the 
coefficients and constant from the regression outputs and multiplied the test data variables 
with those coefficients. The model would have calculated a predicted value for each 
observation. Then I would have made the same mean value analysis comparing the 
regressions B and C and studying if there were any improvement. Also the risk classification 
analysis could have been made with the same way as in the sample data. 
The difference of testing the model is that the regression coefficients and constant is 
calculated from the different data and the regression line is fitted by the sample data. Using a 
given model to the test data could give whole different answers than in the sample data where 
the model is been made. 
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7. Results to hypothesis 
H1: The macro level variables are significant in the regression model with financial ratios and 
macroeconomic variables when the dependent variable is default of a firm. 
Most of the macroeconomic variables are significant. The most significant is the gross 
national income. The least significant are consumer confidence on economy and interest rate. 
All the variables alone gave some new value to the model, but when they are used together 
they raise a problem of collinearity. Many of the macroeconomic variables are highly 
correlated with each other that using them together is not recommended. The problem to this 
solution is to use them together in one variable. With this way also the significance level 
increases. Hypothesis H1 is thus proven right and is not rejected. 
H2: The macro level variables improve the model’s ability to predict future defaults. 
From mean of predicted value analysis and risk classifications we can see that the regression 
with financial ratios, occurred defaults and fast growth of sales is improved when the 
macroeconomic variables are added. In this paper the macroeconomic variables are used 
together in one dummy variable. This variable reacts quite rarely, but when it does, it has 
some quite reliable information of the macroeconomic state. The prediction abilities do not 
improve dramatically, but there is some improvement. Even that the improvement is very 
small, it can be valuable information. For example the Type I errors in lending decisions (loan 
is granted to a firm that defaults) can be very costly. Avoiding even few of Type I errors can 
have significant savings. Also avoiding Type II errors is important. That is improvement in 
finding good firms and lending money at healthy economic situations is important for the 
lender and for the firms also. Hypothesis H2 is thus proven right and is not rejected. 
H3: The newer the macro data used in model, the more significant the macro data is and better 
it predicts the future defaults. 
The results to hypothesis H3 are quite marginal. We can see some indications that the newer 
macroeconomic data is more valuable, but the significance is so weak that any serious 
conclusions can’t be made. The mean of predicted value of the actually defaulted, non-
defaulted and risk classifications give some indications that the model improves with newer 
macroeconomic data. There is though a change for this happening on coincidence. The same 
discussion as above about Type I- and Type II errors hold here too, but hypothesis H3 does 
not have enough evidence and is this point rejected. Further research with more data is 
recommended. 
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8. Conclusions 
The ambition of this paper was widen the view of the credit ratings from firm specific view to 
more macroeconomic view where also the surrounding world is taken into consideration of 
predicting the default risks. The reason why a firm defaults can be an external shock that has 
nothing to do with the firm’s own actions and qualities. Example of this kind of shock is the 
2008 financial crisis that hit the whole world. In this paper the impacts of it can also be seen 
in quickly risen number of defaults and fallen financial ratios. 
Macroeconomic variables are giving new value to the prediction model, but it seems that this 
value comes exposed mostly in the situations of economic shocks. In normal and smaller 
business cycles these variables seem to live their own lives and alone their default prediction 
value is not so credible. 
The models used in this paper were quite simple and the macroeconomic variable was 
represented in very simple form. I though find it good that the model and variables are simple. 
It is very easy to understand how the macroeconomic variable works in the model. The 
simplicity reduces the risk of wrong conclusions. Even with the simple models there was seen 
some results to the hypotheses. 
I think this is a very good starting point in building a new model and improve it. There are 
infinite possibilities to continue from here. For future research I recommend finding new 
variables. Like export and investment was not included in my models. Also improving the 
models itself is one direction. One example is to use primary component analysis for the 
macroeconomic variable. There are also some much more complicated models available in 
literature. The data could also be expanded. There are a dozen or so industries that could be 
studied and those industries include thousands of firms. Also longer time periods could be 
used. In this paper there is only one large economic shock that affected to the results. The 
study of business cycles could be more represented. The data of economic shocks from 
history may not be easily available or doesn’t even exist, but maybe in the future when new 
shocks occurs this study could be continued. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Finanancial ratio distribution over all observations 
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Appendix 2. Main yearly statistics from construction and retail 
Construction mean of ratios at (t) and default percentages at (t+1) 
year roi gearing quick sales % defaulted % bankrupted 
1999 28.828542 39.604201 2.1376042 1362169.843 2.222222 .3472222 
2000 26.705769 39.279304 2.0733822 1254052.546 2.258852 .2136752 
2001 25.065766 41.73308 2.3380631 1273275.956 2.533784 .1407658 
2002 21.733832 41.996269 2.4902538 1224508.565 2.690355 .1522843 
2003 22.215339 41.53177 2.4047785 1106389.413 2.334715 .1090988 
2004 20.468346 39.462947 2.2242874 1053844.326 2.990767 .080289 
2005 21.137463 39.476536 2.2979776 1130029.069 3.004123 .1767131 
2006 21.010924 39.861191 2.2956066 1175322.96 3.56224 .178112 
2007 21.209915 39.080891 2.5771729 1165528.496 4.157515 .3294635 
2008 18.22688 37.850696 2.6894969 1135338.135 7.06449 .990099 
2009 11.729873 36.12863 2.6914595 1024789.849 7.235206 .9199404 
2010 12.893372 34.734462 2.5554311 970607.2869 7.70138 .978889 
2011 15.706737 35.754681 2.6459781 1054800.858 7.772936 .9186197 
Construction 25 percentiles of ratios at (t) and default percentages at (t+1) 
year roi25 gearing25 quick25 sales25 % defaulted % bankrupted 
1999 7.6 20.45 .7 99231 2.222222 .3472222 
2000 7.1 20.6 .7 104108 2.258852 .2136752 
2001 5.95 22.2 .7 103082.5 2.533784 .1407658 
2002 3.6 22 .7 98273.5 2.690355 .1522843 
2003 3.3 21.4 .8 90962 2.334715 .1090988 
2004 2.2 20 .7 87000 2.990767 .080289 
2005 2.7 19.9 .7 93000 3.004123 .1767131 
2006 3 20 .8 98000 3.56224 .178112 
2007 2.6 18.4 .7 93588 4.157515 .3294635 
2008 0 16.7 .7 86000 7.06449 .990099 
2009 -3.4 14.6 .7 75000 7.235206 .9199404 
2010 -2.4 14.3 .7 75000 7.70138 .978889 
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2011 0 14.9 .7 79000 7.772936 .9186197 
Construction median of ratios at (t) and default percentages at (t+1) 
year roi50 gearing50 quick50 sales50 % defaulted % bankrupted 
1999 24.6 42.8 1.3 280285 2.222222 .3472222 
2000 22.9 44.1 1.3 294665.5 2.258852 .2136752 
2001 21.8 47.1 1.3 288792.5 2.533784 .1407658 
2002 18.9 47.6 1.3 267820.5 2.690355 .1522843 
2003 18.2 46.7 1.4 251197 2.334715 .1090988 
2004 16.9 44.4 1.3 249000 2.990767 .080289 
2005 17.3 44.3 1.3 261501 3.004123 .1767131 
2006 17.5 45 1.3 283876 3.56224 .178112 
2007 17.5 44.3 1.4 265447 4.157515 .3294635 
2008 14.3 44.15 1.4 243026.5 7.06449 .990099 
2009 8.8 45.2 1.4 203000 7.235206 .9199404 
2010 10.1 43.1 1.3 211000 7.70138 .978889 
2011 12 43.8 1.4 227000 7.772936 .9186197 
Construction 75 percentiles of ratios at (t) and default percentages at (t+1) 
year roi75 gearing75 quick75 sales75 % defaulted % bankrupted 
1999 48.2 63.2 2.1 813861.5 2.222222 .3472222 
2000 45.15 65.45 2.3 849601.5 2.258852 .2136752 
2001 42.65 69 2.5 818948.5 2.533784 .1407658 
2002 38.6 70.95 2.5 774122 2.690355 .1522843 
2003 39.1 69.5 2.6 676351 2.334715 .1090988 
2004 38.5 66.7 2.4 673000 2.990767 .080289 
2005 37.5 67.9 2.4 727025 3.004123 .1767131 
2006 36.9 68.6 2.4 803759 3.56224 .178112 
2007 37.8 69.4 2.6 748136 4.157515 .3294635 
2008 35.8 71.4 2.8 729463 7.06449 .990099 
2009 27.8 71.8 2.9 602340 7.235206 .9199404 
2010 28.2 70.5 2.6 614000 7.70138 .978889 
2011 32.3 70.3 2.7 688000 7.772936 .9186197 
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Retail mean of ratios at (t) and default percentages at (t+1) 
year roi gearing quick sales % defaulted % bankrupted 
1999 21.203833 37.173044 2.102398 2447069.31 1.382811 .1050236 
2000 21.244539 36.241772 2.2388243 2443713.935 1.440969 .0818733 
2001 20.472496 37.45669 2.3076525 2570744.013 1.213396 .0647144 
2002 18.107816 36.759797 2.3850008 2431805.647 1.757361 .138739 
2003 17.618129 36.38635 2.3521181 2227026.04 1.740123 .0855798 
2004 18.307806 34.489897 2.1474778 2139214.685 1.736159 .1093643 
2005 16.841294 34.070958 2.2209989 2306179.035 1.779801 .1241722 
2006 17.562592 34.776603 2.3261933 2443720.82 2.04978 .0732064 
2007 16.873907 33.009999 2.4914313 2166617.484 2.719494 .2461611 
2008 13.324572 31.163442 2.6137628 2055804.568 4.366438 .6956336 
2009 7.9052026 29.417887 2.5922928 1895320.403 4.374933 .4299688 
2010 10.691651 28.308805 2.4448726 1972045.827 4.681997 .5386369 
2011 11.466733 28.252937 2.4979857 2069351.271 4.448174 .3881662 
Retail 25 percentiles of ratios at (t) and default percentages at (t+1) 
year roi25 gearing25 quick25 sales25 % defaulted % bankrupted 
1999 4 16.3 .6 129505 1.382811 .1050236 
2000 4.5 16 .6 139764 1.440969 .0818733 
2001 4 16.7 .6 135559 1.213396 .0647144 
2002 2.5 16.6 .6 128570 1.757361 .138739 
2003 1.9 15.9 .5 117106 1.740123 .0855798 
2004 2 15.2 .5 105000 1.736159 .1093643 
2005 .9 14.25 .5 113000 1.779801 .1241722 
2006 2 14.8 .6 123000 2.04978 .0732064 
2007 1 13.5 .5 95000 2.719494 .2461611 
2008 0 11.8 .5 79214.5 4.366438 .6956336 
2009 -3.8 10.5 .5 72000 4.374933 .4299688 
2010 -1.6 9.9 .5 70000 4.681997 .5386369 
2011 -1.7 9.7 .5 70000 4.448174 .3881662 
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Retail median of ratios at (t) and default percentages at (t+1) 
year roi50 gearing50 quick50 sales50 % defaulted % bankrupted 
1999 17.8 39.5 1 472440 1.382811 .1050236 
2000 18.1 40.8 1.1 484213 1.440969 .0818733 
2001 17.2 41.9 1.1 500864 1.213396 .0647144 
2002 15.2 42.3 1.1 456722 1.757361 .138739 
2003 14.3 42.9 1.1 414000 1.740123 .0855798 
2004 14.4 41.1 1.1 379000 1.736159 .1093643 
2005 13.1 41 1.1 409000 1.779801 .1241722 
2006 14.5 41.7 1.1 453000 2.04978 .0732064 
2007 13.4 41.4 1.1 375000 2.719494 .2461611 
2008 10.2 41.55 1.1 323000 4.366438 .6956336 
2009 6.3 41.1 1.1 297000 4.374933 .4299688 
2010 7.9 40 1.1 295648.5 4.681997 .5386369 
2011 8.4 39.8 1.1 298500 4.448174 .3881662 
Retail 75 percentiles of ratios at (t) and default percentages at (t+1) 
year roi75 gearing75 quick75 sales75 % defaulted % bankrupted 
1999 38.1 64.2 2 1705426 1.382811 .1050236 
2000 36.7 65.8 2 1709462 1.440969 .0818733 
2001 34.9 67.6 2.1 1769776 1.213396 .0647144 
2002 33.1 68.7 2.2 1677762 1.757361 .138739 
2003 32.8 69 2.2 1536269 1.740123 .0855798 
2004 33.4 66.7 2.1 1404639 1.736159 .1093643 
2005 31.3 67.55 2.1 1513869 1.779801 .1241722 
2006 31.6 68.8 2.2 1630000 2.04978 .0732064 
2007 31.1 70.2 2.3 1384241 2.719494 .2461611 
2008 27.6 71.8 2.4 1233120.5 4.366438 .6956336 
2009 21.2 72.2 2.4 1089000 4.374933 .4299688 
2010 24 70 2.3 1131300 4.681997 .5386369 
2011 24.5 69.7 2.3 1195500 4.448174 .3881662 
 
